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Hayashi N., Ostrom E., Walker J., Yamagishi T. Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study 11 Rationality and Society. 1999. Vbl. 11. No. 1. P. 27-46.

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Ostrom E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

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Ostrom E. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems// Science. 2009. Vol. 325. No. 5939. P. 419—422.

Ostrom E., Parks R.B., Whitaker G.P. Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces? I/ Public Administration Review. 1973. Vol. 33. No. 5. P. 423-433.

Ostrom E., Parks R.B., Whitaker G.P. Policing Metropolitan America. Washington (DC): U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

Ostrom E., Parks R.B., Whitaker G.P. Patterns of Metropolitan Policing. Cambridge (MA): Ballinger Books, 1978.

Ostrom E., Whitaker G.P., Mastrofski S., Parks R.B., Percy S.L. Basic Issues in Police Performance. Washington (DC): U.S. Department of Justice, 1982.

Ostrom E., Benjamin P., Shivakoti G. Institutions, Incentives, and Irrigation in Nepal. \bl. 1. Bloomington: Indiana University, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 1992.

Ostrom E., Gardner R., Walker J. Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible // American Political Science Review. 1992. Vol. 86. No. 2. P. 404—417.

Ostrom E., Gardner R. Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work // Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1993. Vol. 7. No. 4. P. 93-112.

Ostrom E., Schroeder L., WynneS. Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1993.

Ostrom E., Gardner R., Walker J. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.

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Schmidt D., Shupp R., Walker J., Ostrom E. Playing Safe in Coordination Games: The Roles of Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and History of Play // Games and Economic Behavior. 2003. Vol. 42. No. 2. P. 281—299.

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Walker J., Gardner R., Herr A., Ostrom E. Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes // Economic Journal. 2000. УЯ. 110. No. 460. P. 212-234.

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